Events
Events
Upcoming Events
New Directions in Private Law Theory (November 2021)
I will be presenting a paper in this pre-read conference at UCL. The conference is organised by Charles Mitchell, Prince Saprai, Fabiana Bettini and Martin Fischer.
ABSTRACT for "Distinguishing Between Criminal and Tort Law: Rights and Responsibilites"
I argue that various substantive doctrines in criminal law and tort law suggest that while criminal law implicates blameworthiness whereas tort law implicates a notion of responsibility that is weaker than blameworthiness. This suggests that one plausible way of a distinguishing between criminal law and tort law is appealing to different notions of responsibility. However, I argue that different notions of responsibility cannot provide the full explanation of the similarities and differences between these two domains of law. Hence, I propose a two-pronged explanation where the first prong appeals to different notions of responsibility and the second prong appeals to the rights that are protected by the two domains. Furthermore, I argue that my explanation can shed insight into the divergence of views on whether or not there is a principled distinction between tort and criminal law.
rights in criminal law (july 2022)
I am one of the keynote speakers at this interdiscplinary conference organised by the Institute of Philosophy, University of Graz. The other keynote speakers are: Antony Duff, Tatjana Hörnle, Joachim Renzikowski, Markus Stepanians, and Hammish Stewart.
You can fid the Call for Papers here.
Past Events
Racism and Shame (9 april 2021)
I will be presenting a paper on Racism and Shame at California State University, Long Beach (via Zoom).
disability, Impairment and marginalised functioning (22 March 2021)
I will be joining a (zoom) discussion on my paper “Disability, Impairment, and Marginalised Functioning” for Sara Bernstein’s class on Metaphysics of the Social world with my co-author Katharine Jenkins.
I gave the same talk at the Department seminar at Universisty of Hertfordshire (15 March). I also gave a slightly different version of this talk focusing on proof paradoxes at a work-in-progress workshop at the University of Nottingham (24 February).
Blameworthiness for Negligence (25 February 2021)
Some have argued that we are never blameworthy for negligence when the negligence is not caused by some prior blameworthy decision or action. In this paper, I examine arguments that argue that we are not blameworthy for negligence. One argument appeals to the idea that negligent agents fails to be aware of some relevant information and that they are not blameworthy for such failures. The other argument appeals to the idea that ignorance exculpates. I conclude that even if these arguments succeed, they do so at the cost of undermining the claim that we can be and often are blameworthy for recklessness. I also show that the success of the arguments about our blameworthiness for negligence depend on there being no salient difference between moral and nonmoral ignorance. However, if there is no salient difference between moral and nonmoral ignorance, then this puts pressure on our blameworthiness more globally.
I will be giving a talk for the Criminal Law and the Mind Seminar facilitated by Alexander Greenberg at UCL as a part of his Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship project, Belief in Philosophy and the Criminal Law.
Maastricht Law and Philosophy online seminar (16 November 2020)
I gave a talk in an online seminar series organised by Lucas Miotto on Statistical Generalisations and Stereotyping, and Group Membership-Based Explanations. I defend an agency-based argument against stereotyping. However, this agency-based argument is compatible with the generalsations being correct and with explanations being accurate. Moreover, sometimes, these generalisations and explanations might be justified on other normative (moral, political) grounds. This means, that although we have one reason against the kind of generalisations, stereotypes, and explanations in which I’m interested, they may be, in particular instances, all-things-considered justified. I also apply these lessons to the so-called Proof Paradoxes in legal epistemology.
Legal Philosophy Workshop (16 June - 7 July 2020)
I am a member of the Organizing Committee for the annual LPW. In 2020, LPW took place online over four weeks. Thanks to everyone who participated and making the online version a great success! For more information about LPW (including details about future workshops), please visit our website.
New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (14-16 November 2019)
I gave a talk on “Autonomy and Agency: Lessons from Marginalised Identities” at NOWAR, organised by Dave Shoemaker. This paper is forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (Vol. 7). A version of this talk was also given at USC at a symposium in honour of Gary Watson.
Social Agency
I argue for a substantive account of autonomy and a social account of agency. I take as desiderata the following two claims: (i) Oppression undermines autonomy; and (ii) Learning about oppression can boost one’s agency.
Legal-Phi Interview (April 2020)
I was interviewed by Lucas Miotto. We talked about my work (on legal philosophy, ethics, argumentation, philosophy of race among other things!), how I got into philosophy, my experience at grad school, baking pies, hockey, and Jane Austen.
Just Philosophy 3
For most of the history of Philosophy, members of several social groups including women, members of racial and ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities, have been actively excluded from the discipline or forced to operate on its margins. This annual workshop is motivated by the thought that in order for the present-day practice of Philosophy to be truly just, we, as members of the discipline, must confront this discriminatory past and actively work to overcome its continuing effects, which include the under-representation of women, racial and ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities (among others) at all levels. Sessions will focus on practical efforts to address this issue and we hope to provide an opportunity to discuss challenges, share strategies, and think about avenues for further investigation.
public Discussion on Racism
I organised and participated in a public panel discussion on race and racism at an art gallery, Nottingham Contemporary, with Panya Banjoko, Yassmin and Kristy Warren on 26 July 2018.
social metaphysics Conference (10-12 July 2018)
I co-presented a talk on "Disability, Impairment, and Marginalised Functioning" with Katharine Jenkins at the University of Nottingham
[Organised by Mark Jago and Katharine Jenkins]
Shame and Racism
I presented on shame and racism at the 4th Barcelona Conference on Gender, Race, and Sexuality.